China, Google, and the Intersection of Competition and Intellectual Property by Neve, Brett M.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 38 | Number 4 Article 5
Summer 2013
China, Google, and the Intersection of
Competition and Intellectual Property
Brett M. Neve
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brett M. Neve, China, Google, and the Intersection of Competition and Intellectual Property, 38 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1091 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol38/iss4/5
China, Google, and the Intersection of Competition and Intellectual
Property
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol38/iss4/5
China, Google, and the Intersection of Competition
and Intellectual Property
BRETT M. NEVEf
I. Introduction .................................... 1091
II. China's Anti-Monopoly Law............ .......... 1095
A. Legislative History and Basic Principles ... ...... 1095
B. Mechanics of Merger Review .......... ...... 1096
Ill. Google's Acquisition of Motorola..................... 1101
A. Department of Justice Decision ............... 1101
B. Ministry of Commerce Decision. ............... 1103
IV. China's Compulsory Licensensing Policy within the
Context of the Anti-Monopoly Law's Merger Review ...1106
A. The Intersection of Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Law ................... ..... 1106
B. Irreconcilable Differences: The Chinese and
American Approaches to Compulsory Licensing.....1109
V. Implications of Irreconcilable Compulsory Licensing
Policies: Recommendations for a Path Forward.............. 1115
A. Is an International Antitrust Agreement the
Solution? . .............................. 1115
B. In Favor of the Evolving Status Quo ...... ....... 1124
VI. Conclusion................................ 1126
I. Introduction
Since Deng Xiaopeng's rise to power in 1978, the People's
Republic of China has been on a journey towards economic
liberalization.' While that road has been rocky at times-State
t B.A., University of North Carolina, Wilmington, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of
North Carolina School of Law, 2014. 1 would like to thank my family for their love and
support. I would also like to thank Ashley for enduring musings that far too often flirted
with the bounds of lucidity.
I See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 172-73 (2006)
(citing Deng, a promoter of pragmatic economics who was initially denounced as a
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Owned Enterprises (SOE) and Administrative Monopolies still
represent major barriers to competition 2-China has reached
several noteworthy milestones.' With reform toward a market-
oriented economy, China has embraced, albeit tentatively, the
need for more "formalized and institutionalized competition law."4
In 2007, China took yet another historic step towards achieving its
ideal "socialist market economy"5 with the passage of the Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML), the first comprehensive competition law
in the country's history.6
Considering that the United States Supreme Court once
heralded antitrust law, specifically the Sherman Antitrust Act, as
"the Magna Carta of free enterprise,"7 one might have predicted
the AML's passage to meet much aggrandizement in the western
world.' However, the initial reaction to the AML was decidedly
skeptical, with much of the commentary focusing on the law's
perceived shortcomings.' Criticism was especially strong in the
"capitalist roader" for sparking the initial move away from the command economy of the
Mao regime).
2 See Zhengxin Huo, A Tiger Without Teeth: The Antitrust Law of the People's
Republic of China, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 32, 32-33 (2008) ("Administrative
monopolies are arguably the greatest hindrance to fair competition in China today.").
3 See generally Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic
Transition, Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 643, 652-71 (2010)
(chronicling liberalization from 1978 up to the passage of the Anti-Monopoly Law in the
areas of price control, economic decentralization, market concentration, market entry
restrictions, state owned enterprises, and general regulations).
4 See Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism:
Reconsidering China's Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 389 (2009).
5 See XIANFA, art. 15 (1993) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/
constitution/constitution.html (enshrining in the Constitution the idea that "[t]he state has
put into practice a socialist market economy[]"); see also Harris, supra note 1, at 185
(defining a socialist market economy as one "using market competition to enhance the
efficient allocation of resources while restricting, or at least transitioning gradually
towards, private ownership of property").
6 See H. STEPHEN HARRIS JR. ET AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN
CHINA 1 (2011).
7 See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("[Antitrust
laws] are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
system as the Bill of Rights is to protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.").
8 See generally Huo, supra note 2, at 32-33 ("Since the largest developing
country in the world can now claim to have a systematic antitrust law, the law's passage
is a historic moment in China's legal history.").
9 See id at 32-33 ("[The AML has] aroused suspicion and even criticism ...
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United States, where concerns that the AML would be used as a
protectionist tool overshadowed any praise of the law as a move
towards freer competition within Chinese markets.'o The United
States generally harbors a cynical view of China, especially in
regard to economic issues, with fifty-nine percent of Americans
viewing China as an economic threat rather than as an
opportunity." During a hearing of the House Subcommittee on
Courts and Competition Policy, Representative Hank Johnson
encapsulated the skepticism that prevails in the United States by
emphasizing the concern within the business community that the
AML will be enforced in a "discriminatory manner," which would
further weaken the ability of American businesses to compete in
China.'2
Although the AML is still in its infancy, its early application
has done little to quell the international community's worries.1
The Chineses Ministry of Commerce's (MOFCOM) most recent
decision, regarding Google Inc.'s acquisition of Motorola Mobility
Inc., shows a Chinese merger authority that is increasingly willing
to flex its regulatory muscles.'4 Chinese officials approved the
mainly from within China's legal and business communities, and stems from a view that
the law's final draft is merely a compromise to appease China's powerful vested interest,
especially the huge state-owned enterprises."); see also Zheng, supra note 3, at 651
("[D]espite having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not developed and likely will
not develop Western-style antitrust jurisprudence in the near future due to [local
conditions]."); Harris, supra note 1, at 171 (noting the concern that the AML's
enforcement provisions may only be used against foreign companies, which would
inevitably, if not consciously, benefit domestic firms). But see Mehra & Yanbei, supra
note 4, at 383 ("[T]he AML has the potential to spark a 'competition culture'-an
appreciation of the value of promoting and safeguarding competition-that could
positively impact central government competitive restraints as well.").
10 See, e.g., Mehra & Yanbei, supra note 4, at 380-86.
11 See GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS:
KEY FINDINGS 13 (2012) (finding that, among the nationalities surveyed, Americans were
the second most threatened by China's economic rise).
12 Impact of China's Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on US.
Companies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition of the H Comm.
on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. I (2010) (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson, Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
13 See generally HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 126 (noting that all of the
conditional approvals have involved transactions between foreign companies and the
only denial involved a foreign company's attempted acquisition of a Chinese company).
14 See John Letzing & Paul Mozur, China Clears Google to Buy Motorola
Mobility, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527
10932013
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merger on the express condition that Google continue to license its
Android mobile-device software freely for five years.'" The
compulsory licensing conditions placed on the merger prompted
claims that China was infringing on Google's intellectual property
rights. 6 China's decision was the latest chapter in a long and
complicated history of tension between Beijing and Google.17
This note will argue that the Google/Motorola case is best
understood within the context of China's views on the appropriate
balance between the free exercise of intellectual property rights
and competition concerns, rather than on some notion of inherent
biases within the merger review process. The note will be divided
into four parts: First, an overview of the AML with an emphasis
on legislative history and the merger review process; second, a
breif discussion of the Google/Motorola transaction, focusing in
particular on Google's desire to leverage its acquisition of
Motorola's extensive patent portfolio by entering the mobile
handset market; third, an exploration of the Google/Motorola case
through the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law
including consideration of the validity of claims that the AML
merger review process is being manipulated to benefit Chinese
companies and a demonstration of why any current tendencies
favoring domestic firms are not cause for alarm; finally,
recommendations for how the United States, multinational firms,
and other international actors can maximize efficiency and reach
the most positive outcomes in future multinational mergers subject
to Chinese regulatory approval.
02303360504577414280414923956.html.
I5 See id.
16 See id
17 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE
SHOULD WORRY) 115-19 (2011) (documenting the history of conflict between Google and
China including: a breach in Google's security by Chinese hackers seeking access to the
accounts of Chinese dissidents; China's decision to censor Google searches conducted
within China; and Google's decision, in March 2010, to leave China and abandon its
Mandarin-language search service). Further complicating issues for Google are industry
groups' efforts to persuade the United States and the European Union to bring antitrust
actions against Google in connection with its expanding smartphone business. See
David Saleh Rauf & Elizabeth Wasserman, Mobil: The New Frontier in Claims Against
Google, POLITICO, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/
82706.html.
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II. China's Anti-Monopoly Law
A. Legislative History and Basic Principles
The first draft of the AML was, at least in part, the byproduct
of China's ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
November 11, 2002." Responding to unease in the international
community that China would have difficulty complying with "the
WTO's requirements of transparency and non-discrimination,"' 9
the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee
announced that it would draft an antitrust law.2 0 Despite initial
support for further economic liberalization as a show of good faith
to the WTO, the legislative process stalled many times over the
next decade as internal forces stoked fears that social unrest, job
losses, and political backlash would accompany the law's
passage.21 However, external pressures coupled with domestic
forces bent on reform prevailed.2 2 The Tenth NPC passed the
AML on August 30, 2007, and the law went into effect on August
1, 2008.23
The objectives and overarching principles of the law are stated
plainly in the first article: "This law is enacted for the purposes of
preventing and prohibiting Monopolistic Conduct, protecting fair
market competition, promoting efficiency of economic operation,
safeguarding the interests of consumers and the public interests,
and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market
economy." 24 The broad goals of the AML are consistent with
18 See Harris, supra note 1, at 176.
19 Id. at 176-77.
20 See id.
21 See id at 177.
22 See id. ("Other factors, such as a massive influx of foreign investment; the
concomitant internationalization of Chinese markets; and the rapidly growing
participation of Chinese entities, both state-owned and private, in the market have
combined to increase support of, and a broad recognition of the need for, a
comprehensive, strongly enforced competition law.").
23 Huo, supra note 2, at 32.
24 Fanlongduan Fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] ch. 1., art. 1 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat'1 People's Cong, Aug. 20, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008)
2007 Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. Gaz. 517 (China) [hereinafter AML]. An
unofficial English translation is available through the American Bar Association. Nathan
Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, THE
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2007, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
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western antitrust ideals insofar as they ensure consumer welfare by
promoting efficiency and market competition.2 5 The AML
addresses the three hallmarks of classic antitrust law-monopoly
agreements, abuse of dominance, and merger review 26-all of
which are similarly addressed by the law's western counterparts in
the United States27 and the European Union.28 Although the core
of the AML is rooted in traditional antitrust law, the economic
history and local conditions in China made unique provisions to
address the vestiges of the country's socialist past a necessity.2 9
B. Mechanics of Merger Review
Of particular interest to this note are the provisions of the
AML outlining the merger review process.30 The AML merger
review provisions address the transactions covered, the threshold
requirements for submission, the review procedure, the substantive
standard of review, and the possible outcomes." The AML grants
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust source/OctO7 Bushl0_18f.authcheckdam.pdf.
25 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW viii-ix (2d ed. 2001).
26 See AML, supra note 24, ch. 1, art. 3 ("Monopolistic Conduct [is the] (1)
conclusion of monopoly agreements by undertakings; (2) abuse of dominant market
positions by undertakings; (3) concentrations of undertakings that have or are likely to
have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition."); see also Zheng, supra note 3,
at 647-48.
27 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006); see also Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006).
28 See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty Establishing the European Union and
the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 81, 82, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J.
(C 321) [hereinafter EU Treaty].
29 See Zheng, supra note 3, at 651. Specifically, there are provisions explicitly
addressing administrative monopolies, as well as SOES. See AML, supra note 24, ch. 5,
art. 37 (appearing to exempt SOEs from the provisions of the AML). Although the
provisions regarding administrative monopolies and SOEs will play an important role in
establishing the credibility and enforceability of the AML, they are beyond the scope of
this note. See Harris, supra note 1, at 172 (articulating concern over the degree to which
the AML will apply to effectively address issues concerning administrative monopolies
given that the provisions regulating their conduct were at one point in the drafting
process completely omitted); see also Bruce M. Owen et al., Antitrust Law in China: The
Problem of Incentive Compatibility, I J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 133 (2005)
(predicting that the legal system in China will be incapable of protecting private rights
with the desired effect).
30 See AML, supra note 24, ch. 4.
31 See id.
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review authority to the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority,3 2
which is located within MOFCOM.3 3
The AML merger review provisions apply to concentrations,
which are defined as "(1) a merger of undertakings; (2) an
acquisition by an undertaking of the control of other undertakings
through acquiring equity or assets; [or] (3) an undertaking, by
contracts or other means, acquiring control of other undertakings
or the capability to exercise decisive influence on other
undertakings."34 The Notification Threshold Regulation
established the thresholds for mandatory submission of
transactions for regulatory approval:
[T]he combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings
involved in the last fiscal year exceeds [US $1.47 billion], and
the China-wide turnover of each of at least two undertakings
exceeds [US $58.8 million]; or the combined China-wide
turnover of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year
exceeds [US $294 million], and the China-wide turnover of each
of at least two undertakings exceeds [US $58.8 million].35
The threshold regulations allow for decision-making based on
objectively quantifiable data,36 which is a marked improvement
from earlier drafts that focused on the less objective market share
criteria. Although the notification thresholds are lower than
many observers would have liked, the thresholds "find a balance
between underreporting of transactions important to China and
overburdening both parties and MOFCOM reviewers."
In addition to mandatory notification review, MOFCOM may
32 See id. art. 21.
33 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 125.
34 See AML, supra note 24, art. 20.
35 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 139 (emphasis in original) (noting that the
Regulation of Notification Thresholds was adopted by the State Council on August 1,
2008, the day the AML became effective, providing some evidence of the importance
China places on its merger review process).
36 See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR
MERGER NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, available at http://www.intemationalcompetition
network.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf. ("Notification thresholds should be based
exclusively on objectively quantifiable criteria. Examples of objectively quantifiable
criteria are assets and sales [e.g. turnover].").
3 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 140.
38 Id.
2013 1097
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launch investigations where the transaction would not otherwise
meet the mandatory thresholds if "facts and evidence gathered
pursuant to prescribed procedures indicate that such concentration
has or may have the effect of restricting or eliminating
competition."39 Such discretion has incited concern that
uncertainty regarding which transactions will be subjected to
regulatory approval will raise transaction costs. 4 0  Furthennore,
multinational businesses protested that discretionary review could
be used to protect favored domestic companies from competition,
at the expense of foreign competitors, specifically where
MOFCOM is subjected to pressure by "domestic competitors,
industry associations, or other government ministries" with an
interest in the outcome. 4 ' Although the AML has only a brief
enforcement history, such concerns appear to be unfounded given
that MOFCOM has yet to use its discretionary authority to review
any transaction not falling under the mandatory notification
thresholds.42
Merger review is the most-developed mechanism of the AML,
consisting of several procedural requirements.43 If a transaction
meets the mandatory thresholds or is subject to discretionary
review, the parties must submit a detailed filing to MOFCOM
before closing the deal.44 Notice of further review must be
provided, but MOFCOM is not required to publicize such
decisions and has not done so in practice.4 5 If any competition
concerns arise, the parties are permitted to submit additional
filings.46 Perhaps the most important consideration to note is that
the parties are prohibited from closing the transaction and
implementing the merger until the end of the review period, which
can be as long as 120 days.4 7 Where the procedural standards of
39 Id. at 142 (quoting the Notification Thresholds Regulation, art. 4) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
40 See id
41 Seeid
42 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 142.
43 See id. at 145.
44 See AML, supra note 24, arts. 21, 23.
45 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 150.
46 See id ("[P]arties must 'submit their defense within the specified time limit with
facts, reasons, and evidences."').
47 See id.
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merger review are more or less plainly stated, the substantive
standard of review is much more ambiguous and will be defined
by later interpretation.48 The standard in the AML gives little
guidance; MOFCOM will prohibit any merger or acquisition that
"has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting
competition."4 9
However, the AML does provide some guidance for parties
subject to review.so Article 27 makes clear that MOFCOM will
consider the following factors in reviewing transactions with
potential effects on competition: (1) the market share of the parties
in the "Relevant Market"; (2) "the degree of concentration in the
relevant market";" (3) the effect of the transaction on "market
access and technological progress";5 2 (4) the effect of the
transaction on "consumers and other relevant undertakings";5 3 (5)
the effect of the transaction on the Chinese economy; and (6)
"other factors" the reviewing authority finds relevant. In
addition to guidance within the AML, the few published decisions
provide useful insights into the AML's application, which are
particularly applicable to the Google/Motorola decision.5 5  For
instance, MOFCOM stringently examines "potential future
barriers to entry."5 6 Also, it appears MOFCOM will show special
concern for the effect of the concentration on smaller competitors,
which will often be domestic or regional firms." Another early
takeaway is that Chinese regulators show particular interest where
48 See id. at 156 ("MOFCOM's merger decisions so far have tended to be more
conclusory than analytical.").
49 AML, supra note 24, art. 28.
50 See id art. 27.
51 Id. art. 27(1)-(2).
52 Id. art. 27(3).
53 Id. art 27(4).
54 AML, supra note 24, art. 27(5)-(6).
55 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 163.
56 See id. at 159-60, 163 (citing the Coca-Cola-Huiyuan decision where
MOFCOM prohibited the acquisition of a Chinese juice company in part because of
concerns that the acquisition would raise barriers to entry in the juice beverage market).
57 See id. at 159-61, 163 (citing the decisions in Coca-Cola-Huiyuan as evidence
that where a transaction may prevent local manufacturers from competing, the
concentration may be denied, and Pfizer- Wyeth where the merger was approved with
conditions because without the conditions Pfizer might have been able to leverage its
size and market control to restrict future development of competitors).
2013 1099
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the combination involves two or more well established brands."
Finally, criticism from "domestic trade associations, competitors,
customers, or suppliers," when focused on a transaction involving
a foreign company, will likely cause "increased scrutiny and delay
and possibly significant conditions on approval."59
The AML's merger review affords three potential outcomes:
approval,60 approval with conditions,6 or denial.6 2 Article 29
establishes the conditional approval option: "If the Anti-Monopoly
Law Enforcement Authority... does not prohibit the concentration
of undertakings, it may decide to impose restrictive conditions to
reduce the adverse effects the concentration may have on
competition."6 Considering that the brief provision above is the
only guidance regarding conditional approvals, MOFCOM may
exercise broad discretion in deciding when conditions are
appropriate and what conditions may be applied.6 4 Insights into
MOFCOM's reasoning and decision making process are limited,
but the AML does provide for some modicum of transparency
with regard to conditional approvals by requiring the publication
of decisions to "prohibit concentration of undertakings or to
impose restrictive conditions on the concentration."
58 See id. at 159-60, 163 (citing Coca-Cola-Huiyuan because of the strict scrutiny
applied by MOFCOM, where the global beverage giant, Coca-Cola, who already owned
the Minute Maid brand, sought to acquire Huiyuan, a popular juice manufacturer in
China).
59 See id. at 159-61, 163 (citing the decisions in GM-Delphi, where GM's
acquisition of an automotive parts manufacturer, Delphi, was approved with conditions,
and Coca-Cola-Huiyuan, where the acquisition of a major Chinese brand by an
American company was prohibited).
60 See AML, supra note 24, art. 25, 26.
61 See id art. 29. The Google/Motorola case deals with a conditional approval;
therefore, it is useful to sketch out the details of the mechanism for such approvals. See
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, ANNOUNCEMENT No. 25, 2012 OF THE MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF APPROVAL WITH ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIVE
CONDITIONS OF THE ACQUISITION OF MOTOROLA MOBILITY BY GOOGLE (2012)
[hereinafter MOFCOM DECISION] (English translation), available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/201206/2012060819
9125.html.
62 See id. art. 28.
63 See AML, supra note 24, art. 29.
6 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 167-68.
65 See AML, supra note 24, art. 30.
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III. Google's Acquisition of Motorola
On August 25, 2011, Google entered into an agreement to
purchase Motorola Mobility,66 a transaction ultimately worth $12.5
billion.6 7 Google's motivation to pursue the deal was the
acquisition of 17,000 issued patents and 6,800 patent applications,
including hundreds relating to wireless devices.68 The transaction
was submitted for merger approval to regulators in the United
States, the European Union, and China, as well as several other
states.69
A. Department ofJustice Decisiono
The U.S. merger authorities, the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, approved
the merger on February 13, 2012." The Antitrust Division
approved the merger without conditions.7 2 However, it did voice
concerns that Google might abuse its newly acquired intellectual
property, resulting in harm to future innovation and consumer
welfare." The specific issues addressed by the United States
focused on "Standard Essential Patents."7 4 These concerns arose
from the fact that the wireless device industry requires "seamless
interoperability" with "wireless communications technologies
while providing audio, video and computer functionalities."
66 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S
ANTITRUST DIVISION ON ITS DECISION TO CLOSE ITS INVESTIGATIONS OF GOOGLE INC.'S
ACQUISITION OF MOTOROLA MOBILITY HOLDINGS INC. AND THE ACQUISITION OF CERTAIN
PATENTS BY APPLE INC., MICROSOFT CORP. AND RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD. 2 (2012)
[hereinafter DOJ STATEMENT], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press
releases/2012/280190.htm.
67 See Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14.
68 See DOJ STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 2.
69 See Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14.
70 This Note focuses on the decision by MOFCOM and its impact on the global
climate for international intellectual property acquisitions. However, given that
MOFCOM released limited information concerning the reasoning behind its decision, it
is useful to examine the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division's reasoning as a
supplement to the Chinese decision on the same facts.
71 See DOJ STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 1.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75 Id.
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Firms in the industry use standard setting organizations (SSO) "to
develop technical standards that establish precise specification for
essential components of the technology."7 6 The SSOs improve
compatibility among devices and, therefore, provide consumers
with greater options in the marketplace.7 7 More often than not, the
technology adopted by a SSO will be the intellectual property of
one of the industry participants." Patents that are included in the
standard eventually become "essential to the implementation of
that standard, thus the term 'Standard Essential Patent."'7 9 The
establishment of Standard Essential Patents prompts other market
participants to rely on the technology, making it expensive to
abandon the standard."
Although, generally, SSOs benefit consumers by promoting
competition, they can also have anticompetitive effects if
subjected to abuse."' When the patent is embraced in a SSO and
induces investments by other market participants, the technology
increases in value.8 2 The patent holder is then positioned to extract
payments higher than the original value of the licensed technology
by exploiting other market participants' reliance on the technology
as a standard, with the ultimate effect of retarding innovation and
harming consumer choice.83 While the Antitrust Division
determined that the acquisition by Google was not likely to spawn
any anticompetitive effects, the Division did express concern that
Google did not unequivocally commit to exercising its intellectual
property rights in a "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory"
manner.84 For instance, there was trepidation that Google could
limit access to the wireless Standard Essential Patents acquired
from Motorola or charge unreasonable licensing fees that make
licensees choose between abandoning the technology and paying
76 Id
77 DOJ STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 3.
78 See id
79 Id
80 See id.
81 See id
82 See id
83 DOJ STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 3.
84 Id
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the increased fee.
Such concerns were amplified by the fact that, as of 2011,
Google's Android mobile device operating platform controlled
forty-six percent of the U.S. market." The Android software was
developed using a freely available open source model, "which
allows programmers outside the company to view the product's
underlying code and make modifications." In circumstances
analogous to the Standard Essential Patent context, companies
who commit their software to open sourcing may entice others to
make "complementary investments."8 8  Therefore, were a
company to curtail the availability of its technology after open
sourcing it, market participants who have invested in reliance on
the availability of the technology can be harmed and competition
restricted. 89  There is fear that if Google were to restrict the
availability of Android by providing the software only to
Motorola, for instance, it could exploit the market position held by
Android and the manufacturing capabilities of Motorola to impede
competition in the smartphone market.90
B. Ministry of Commerce Decision
On September 30, 2011, MOFCOM received the
Google/Motorola merger for review.9 1 The initial review raised
concerns that the agreement may "eliminate or restrict
competition" in the market for smartphone mobile operating
systems, which prompted further review pursuant to Article 26.92
On March 20, 2012, MOFCOM extended its review with the
consent of Google pursuant to Article 26(1).93 Upon further
review, MOFCOM determined that Google's acquisition would
85 See id.
86 See id. at 2 ("Google's Android accounted for approximately 46 percent of the
U.S. smartphone operating system platform subscribers and Apple's iOS was used by
about 30 percent of subscribers. RIM and Microsoft accounted for approximately 15
percent and 6 percent of the share of smartphone subscribers, respectively.").
87 Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14.
88 See DOJ STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 3.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61.
92 See id
93 See id.
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have "competition-eliminating or restricting effects."94 The
transaction was approved with the following restrictions, which
were imposed in an effort to eliminate, or mitigate, any future
anticompetitive effect:
(I) Google will continue its current commercial practice of
providing a free and open Android platform.
(II) Google shall treat all original equipment manufacturers [in a
non-discriminatory manner] in terms of the Android platform . .
. . This obligation does not apply to Google providing, licensing
or distributing of any products or services relating to the
Android platform (including but not limited to applications
running on the Android platform).
(III) After this transaction, Google shall continue to fulfill the
FRAND (fair, responsible, and non-discriminatory terms)
obligations of Motorola Mobility regarding the latter's patents.95
Restrictions (I) and (II), compelling licensure of the Android
operating platform, will be effective for five years, and require
Google to report to MOFCOM every six months to ensure its
compliance."
Given the similar issues articulated by the Antitrust Division
and MOFCOM, the divergent results were a surprise.97 Although
the MOFCOM statement is largely conclusory, providing minimal
insight into the Ministry's reasoning, the conditions imposed lead
to the inference that MOFCOM shared the Antitrust Division's
concerns that a decision by Google to limit the availability of
Android by charging licensing fees or providing Motorola with
preferential treatment could restrain competition in the mobile
handset market.9 8 However, instead of taking the wait-and-see
approach adopted by U.S. antitrust officials, MOFCOM acted
94 Id
95 Id.
96 See MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61.
97 See generally Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14 (reporting that the United States
and European Union expressed concerns similar to that of the Chinese authorities, but
when the MOFCOM decision was announced, months after the United States and
European Union decisions, Chinese regulators treated the transaction in a much harsher
manner).
98 Compare MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61, with DOJ STATEMENT, supra note
66, at 3.
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assertively to cut off any potential threat to competition.99 The
condition compelling Google to freely license its Android software
prompted renewed criticism that China was using the AML to
disadvantage foreign competitors. 00  In fact, initial reports
indicated that the compulsory licensing requirement was
specifically "aimed at helping domestic competitors such as ZTE
Corp. and Huawei Technologies Co., which offer smartphones that
use Android and are increasingly competing" with foreign-made,
Android-based smartphones.' 0 ' By requiring Google to freely
license Android, Google will be prevented from restricting access,
which might impair the burgeoning domestic manufacturers.'0 2
The fact that "[t]he Chinese government has been seeking to spur
local innovation within the technology sector to wean itself off of
a reliance on costly foreign technology" did nothing to alleviate
concerns that the merger review process was disproportionately
affecting foreign companies, while exempting Chinese
counterparts altogether.'0 3
Anxiety over the Google-Motorola decision appears to follow
the familiar chorus line of critics predicting abuse of the merger
review process upon the passage of the AML.104  Despite
MOFCOM's official position that "all mergers whose size reach a
certain threshold should be notified," critics argue that the
structure of the AML and the local conditions in China will
preclude equal application in merger review."0' Given the
99 Compare MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61, with DOJ STATEMENT, supra
note 66, at 3.
100 See Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See Zheng, supra note 3, at 709 ("[A] disproportionately high percentage of
foreign companies involved in cases notified to MOFCOM and in cases for which
MOFCOM published its merger review decisions has led to suspicions or charges that
MOFCOM discriminated against foreign companies in its merger review process."); see
also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 126 (noting that the vast majority of conditional
approvals involved a foreign company, and the only denial involved a foreign acquisition
of a company with firm roots in China); Huo, supra note 2, at 32-33 (commenting that
the AML is a compromise to appease vested interest in the business community and
government, and, therefore, it will fail to apply equally to domestic firms, SOEs, and
administrative monopolies).
105 See Zheng, supra note 3, at 709.
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structural issues and lack of enforcement against domestic
companies, it is not unreasonable to explain the Google/Motorola
case as a high-profile example of Beijing manipulating the merger
review process to protect its homegrown industries at the expense
of encroaching foreign competitors.' 6  However, as will be
discussed in the next Part, the Google/Motorola case is more fully
explained within the context of the two states' divergent
approaches to the intersection between competition law and
intellectual property rights.10 7  Part IV argues that China has
adopted a compulsory licensing policy that is inconsistent with
that of the United States, due in no small part to its economic and
political history, and that this policy informed the decision in the
Google/Motorola case, rather than any inherent bias within the
AML or perverse protectionist tendencies in MOFCOM.'s
IV. China's Compulsory Licensensing Policy within the
Context of the Anti-Monopoly Law's Merger Review
A. The Intersection ofIntellectual Property Rights and
Competition Law
Innovation drives long-term economic growth.'0 9 Investment
106 See generally Michael Jacobs & Xinzhu Zhang, China, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA 149, 149-52 (R. Ian McEwin ed.,
2011) (noting that it is in China's national interest to pursue compulsory licensing
policies that benefit domestic consumers and competitors above foreign holders of
powerful intellectual property rights).
107 See generally id. at 127-38, 149-52 (explaining that all states seek to maximize
their interests through antitrust policy, so while the approaches of different states may
lead to inconsistent results, it does not necessarily follow that either state is a bad actor
seeking to maliciously harm other states).
108 See infra Parts IV, V.
109 See R. Ian McEwin, Editor's Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA, supra note 107, at 3; see also Michael A.
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 802 (2002)
("Innovation consists of 'the search for and discovery, development, improvement,
adoption, and commercialization of new processes, products, and organizational
structures and procedures."') (quoting Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation,
Cooperation, and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 48
(Thomas M. Jorde & David Teece eds.)). Technological and scientific innovation
accounted for at least a fifty percent increase in output in the United States between the
late 1920s to the late 1960s. See id at 814-15. Subsequently, "declines in innovation
contributed to a reduction in the growth of the business-sector productivity by roughly
sixty-five percent from the 1947-1973 period to the 1973-1987 period."Id. at 814.
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in research and development is the key to fostering domestic
innovation."' 0 Generally, the strength of intellectual property
rights correlates with returns from domestic research and
development."' If rights are weak, the state can expect diminished
returns from research and development investments.'12 Therefore,
states have an interest in protecting intellectual property rights in
order to encourage businesses to invest in innovation.1 3 However,
intellectual property rights are limited in an attempt to strike a
balance "between protecting the intellectual property holder's
exclusive rights and encouraging access to unprotected
information."" When the balance is properly struck, intellectual
property laws will provide maximum incentive for investment in
innovation, given that the investor will have confidence that she
will realize the commercial value of any invention, and others in
the market will be assured access to the technology behind
valuable inventions upon the expiration of the patent.' 15
In general, intellectual property law and antitrust law "share
the fundamental goals of enhancing consumer welfare and
promoting innovation."' 16 However, intellectual property rights,
which are "designed to promote innovation," can clash with
competition law, which attempts to "ensure new ideas and
expression are disseminated at least cost as widely as possible."" 7
In information-based, high-technology economies, intellectual
property rights occupy an increasingly important position."'8  As
110 See McEwin, supra note 109, at 3.
Ili Seeid.at4.
112 See id
113 See id.; see also Carrier, supra note 109, at 767-68 (noting that where inventors
expend resources creating inventions, appropriation by others who did not make such
investments of time and capital will deter future investments, with the ultimate effect of
reducing innovation).
114 See Seungwoo Son, Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship
Between Patent Rights and Antitrust Law, 2002 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL'Y 109, 123
(2002).
115 See id
116 Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 125.
117 See McEwin, supra note 109, at 4; see also Carrier, supra note 109, at 768
("The antitrust laws ... scrutinize activity that restricts competition. The rationale of the
laws is that competition leads to lower prices, higher output, and more innovation,
and ... conduct by monopolists prevents consumers from enjoying these benefits.").
I18 Carrier, supra note 109, at 762-63.
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the importance of intellectual property rights increases, the impact
of the issues at the intersection of intellectual property and
antitrust will be felt with greater magnitude." 9
Where a single intellectual property holder gains substantial
market power as a result of a powerful intellectual property right,
anticompetitive results can occur.12 0 In particular, rigorous
protection of high-technology intellectual property can raise
barriers to innovation and deprive consumers of choice because
the intellectual property holder will be able to drive competitors
from the market by exploiting its sanctioned monopoly over the
technology.'2 ' The intersection of intellectual property and
competition law presents a policy choice between protecting
intellectual property rights, thus encouraging "optimal innovation
over time (dynamic efficiency),"' 22 and promoting competition,
ensuring "efficient short-term resource allocation (static or
allocative efficiency)."' 2 3 States walk the line between dynamic
and static efficiency in a myriad of ways, as informed by their
current economic position and future goals.12 4
How a given state walks that line is causally related to its
policy regarding compulsory licensing of intellectual property.125
Compulsory licensing, in the context of merger review, serves the
purpose of remedying "the anti-competitive misuse of intellectual
property by a dominant firm, which has foreclosed smaller rivals
from market access." 26 Therefore, compulsory licensing is used
as a solution to static inefficiency, or the "loss incurred when an
intellectual property owner appropriates rents by excluding others
from the relevant market and charging a monopoly price." 27
Reducing static inefficiency naturally has the inverse effect on
dynamic efficiency, in that compulsory licensing will weaken
intellectual property rights, thus sparking dynamic loss through
119 Id.
120 See id.
121 See Son, supra note 114, at 190.
122 See McEwin, supra note 109, at 5.
123 See id at 5.
124 See id. at 4-6.
125 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 125.
126 Id. at 126.
127 Id
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decreased investment in research and development.' 2 8 Again, each
state will have its own answer to the compulsory licensing issue,
which will depend on its own unique circumstances, including
"conceptions of the value of intellectual property, the place of the
dominant firm, the efficacy of the market mechanisms, and the
importance of long-term incentives for economic growth." 29
B. Irreconcilable Differences: The Chinese and American
Approaches to Compulsory Licensing
The American and Chinese approaches to compulsory
licensing are incompatible, and therefore produce inconsistent
results, as seen in the Google/Motorola case.'30 Discrepancies in
the compulsory licensing policies of the world's two largest
economies'"' have inescapable consequences for multinational
businesses, and are likely to increase transaction costs and breed
uncertainty for firms considering any large acquisition.'32 The
divergence is the product of differing objectives and expectations
of the merger review system.'3 3 The American approach to
compulsory licensing generally tends to favor dynamic efficiency
(e.g. long-term innovation), even where there will be
anticompetitive effects.'34 Therefore, the United States is reluctant
to compel licensing of powerful intellectual property. 1' The
United States will allow a firm to refuse to license powerful
intellectual property even when the decision may harm
competition in the short-term.'3 6 This decision places great faith
128 Id
129 Id
130 Compare MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61, with DOJ STATEMENT, supra
note 66, at 3.
131 Andrew Bergmann, World's Largest Economies, CNN, http://money.cnn.com/
news/economy/world-economiesgdp/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
132 See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 355, 355-56 (2004) [hereinafter Guzman, The Case for International
Antitrust] ("Firms must satisfy regulatory agencies in many countries, meaning they
must hire legal representation in each state and meet the reporting and disclosure
requirements of each jurisdiction.").
133 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 129-30, 138-39.
I34 See id. at 133-34.
135 See id. at 128-29.
136 See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.,
540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004).
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on the power of long-term innovation incentive, reasoning "the
possession and retention of monopoly power will create strong
incentives over the long-term for vigorous competition, as each
firm strives to become the monopolist.""' Precisely because all
firms in a given market will strive for monopoly status, few will
ever achieve it.' The necessary corollary is that, when a firm
manages to reach monopoly status, they must be able to reap the
full value of their investments.'39 In fact, as articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, "[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at
least for a short period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the
first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth."' 40 Therefore, in order to maximize innovation,
the United States practices minimum regulatory intervention in the
short-term, which precludes compulsory licensing.' 4 ' In turn, the
United States is willing to tolerate short-term costs to consumers,
such as monopoly prices and lack of competition, in order to
reward innovators and encourage competitors to invest in research
and development to reap similar rewards.'42
While the Supreme Court of the United States has not
addressed the refusal to license intellectual property directly, its
cases interpreting general refusals to deal under the Sherman
Antitrust Act'4 3 provide insight into the policy of providing
stringent protections for intellectual property rights, even at the
expense of competition.144  Verizon Communications Inc., v. Law
137 Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 129.
138 Id. at 128-29.
139 See Verizon Communications, 540 U.S. at 407-08 ("Firms may acquire
monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to
serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in
some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial
facilities.").
140 Id. at 407.
141 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S.Ct. 853 (1982) (noting that patent incentives would be undercut if antitrust
laws proscribed the natural transition of a lawfully granted information monopoly, in the
form of a patent, into an economic monopoly).
142 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 129-32.
143 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (2006).
144 See Verizon Communications, 540 U.S. at 407-10 (describing the limited
circumstances under which anti-competitive behavior in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
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Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP established, with few limitations,
that the Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recognized right
of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal."l4 5 Several U.S. circuit courts
have directly addressed refusals to license intellectual property.'4 6
Those decisions further illuminate the United States' policy
against compulsory licensing.147  One key takeaway from the
decisions of the circuit courts is that there is no general obligation
to license intellectual property to competitors.148 What is less clear
is the extent to which an intellectual property holder may
discontinue licensing intellectual property to rivals once it has
already undertaken the practice voluntarily.14 9 In Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., o the Ninth Circuit held that
"a monopolist's desires to exclude others from its [protected] work
is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate
harm to consumers."'"' A showing that the firm had an ulterior
motive designed to harm competition may rebut the
presumption.15 Therefore, where a "monopolist [relies] upon a
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct,"
the presumption of a valid business justification may be
Anti-Trust Act will be found).
145 Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919))
(internal quotations omitted). The narrow, outer boundary exception to the freedom of
refusal to deal is found in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985). In Aspen Skiing, the Court upheld § 2 liability because the defendant
terminated a voluntary, and thus presumptively profitable, course of dealing, which
showed a willingness and intention to forego short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end. See Verizon Communications, 540 U.S. at 408-10.
146 See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218
(9th Cir. 1996); see also SCM, 645 F.2d at 1205-07.
147 See Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1218; see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,
645 F.2d 1195, 1205-07 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 102 S.Ct. 853 (1982).
148 See Image Technical, 125 F.3d 1216 ("We find no reported case in which a
court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or
copyright.").
149 See id. at 1218.
150 Id.
151 Id. (quoting Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,
1187 (1st Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 See id. at 1219.
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rebutted.'5 3 The subjective standard is a steep burden for parties
seeking to rebut the presumption and thus claim damages as a
result of a firm's abuse of its intellectual property.'54
China rests firmly on the other end of the spectrum, raising a
multitude of issues for firms acquiring powerful intellectual
property and doing business in both China and the United States.
China, along with other notable merger review regimes, 55 puts
greater emphasis on the short-term, ensuring static efficiency by
prohibiting the anticompetitive effect attendant to the refusal to
license powerful intellectual property.156  One factor contributing
to the divergence is China's relative lack of experience regulating
free markets.157  As seen in the European Union, it is hard to
believe that market powers will strike the right balance between
promoting competition and protecting intellectual property rights
153 See id.
154 See id. (describing ways in which the plaintiff can satisfy the subjective standard
and rebut the presumption of a valid business justification).
155 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 127-29, 134-35. This note will focus on
China, given the luminary nature of the recent Google/Motorola decision and growing
impact of China's merger review mechanism, as an example of the approach taken by
countries that place greater emphasis on the short-term benefits to competition.
However, it is important to note that China's approach to the trade-off between static and
dynamic efficiencies, which informs its compulsory licensing policy, is similar to that
seen in the European Union and much of the developing world. See id at 130; see also
McEwin, supra note 109, at 4. For instance, in IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC
Health GmbH & Co. KG, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that it is a violation
of Article 82 of the European Community Treaty, prohibiting abuse of dominate
position, for the holder of indispensable intellectual property to refuse to license that
intellectual property when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the firm attempting
to acquire the license "intends to offer . .. new products or services not offered by the
owner of the intellectual property right and for which there is potential consumer
demand;" (2) "the refusal is not justified by objective considerations;" and (3) the refusal
eliminates "all competition on [the relevant] market." Case C-418/01, IMS Health
GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 1 52, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039.
Initially the IMS Health decision appeared to be a narrow exception to a general rule
allowing unfettered refusal to license. See id However, the subsequent decision in
Microsoft v. Commission expanded each of the three conditions set forth in IMS Health,
greatly increasing the number of transactions that could be subject to compulsory
licensing as a condition of approval. See Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission,
563, 639-41, 680, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
156 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 127-29, 134-35.
157 See id. at 135-36 (using Europe's more established compulsory licensing policy
as an analytical analog for the policy that could be developing in China).
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where the current monopolists are former or current state-owned
firms accustomed to high levels of regulation."' Similar fears are
absent when, as in the United States, any monopolist that emerges
does so "on the merits."'"' The historical efficiency of U.S.
markets gives the United States reason to trust them, and incentive
to err on the side of under-regulation, while "Europe [and China
have] very different experiences with markets, with local
protectionism, with dominant firms and with invention," leading
those states to err on the side of over-regulation. 6 o Instead of
placing their faith in the long-term benefits of incentivizing
investments in innovation, China, the European Union, and other
similarly situated states focus on the immediate benefits to
consumers that derive from smaller rivals gaining access to
technology held by firms subject to the compulsory licensing
condition.' 6'
Similarities with Europe aside, China has specific economic
and historical factors that lead to a heavier hand in compelling
licensing of powerful intellectual property as a remedy to
anticompetitive transactions.162 Generally, states with developing
or transitioning economies have limited investment in research and
development; thus, the incentive to protect intellectual property
rights will be nonexistent because there is little innovation to
protect.163  Such states are often presented with an inverse
incentive: failing to protect intellectual property rights will allow
for the copying of others' intellectual property, which in turn will
allow the local copiers to prosper.16 4  As states transition,
intellectual property protection becomes increasingly important as
158 See id
159 See id. at 135.
160 Id. ("[O]ver the past century markets have worked more effectively in the
United States than in Europe.").
161 Id. at 133 ("[S]maller rivals can improve upon the relevant technology and offer
consumers a greater choice of products . . . at lower prices."). This is not to suggest that
there is a right or wrong answer to the issues raised by the contrast between long term
and short term efficiencies; as noted by Jacobs and Zhang, the long term benefits
preferred by the United States are "notoriously difficult, impossible, to measure." Id at
128.
162 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 149.
163 See McEwin, supra note 109, at 4.
164 See id
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the primary mechanism for encouraging investment and growth in
domestic industries. 6 5
As is the case with many transitioning economies, a majority
of the patents and copyrights in China are held by foreign entities
and are developed abroad.166 Also, the patents and copyrights that
are granted to domestic firms tend to be of lower value, while
many of the patents and copyrights granted to foreign firms are
generally of higher value.'6 7 Typically, the overarching purpose of
patent law is to incentivize investment in research and
development, which is accomplished by rewarding those making
such investments with the commercial advantages gained from
exclusive access to the technology and the ability to charge
monopoly rents.168 However, where foreign firms hold a majority
of the high technology patent rights in a state, the commercial
benefits gained from the ability to charge monopoly rents will be
sucked out of the state by the foreign firms.16 9 In such situations,
protecting intellectual property rights fails to effectuate the typical
purpose of the patent system and instead provides all of the long-
term benefits to foreign firms while leaving the state's consumers
to suffer the short-term competitive detriment of monopoly
rents. 70
Therefore, the function of traditional patent regimes may not
find salience in China.'7 ' By restricting the market power of
patents, which is accomplished through compulsory licensing,
consumers in technology-importing states such as China benefit
from patented technology without paying the additional costs of
165 See id.
166 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 149. In 2008, 50.28% of all inventions
in China were patented to foreign firms. See id. at 150.
167 See id.
168 See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218
(9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the patent system provides privileges to the patent holder to
reward those who take the risk of investing large amounts of time, effort, and capital in
research and development); see also Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 150 ("[T]he
patent system is to provide incentives for firms to invest in R&D by permitting
monopoly rents in return for disclosure to the public of the underlying technology.").
169 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 150-5 1.
170 See id.
171 See id at 15 1.
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monopoly rents.17 2 Moreover, when countries like China fail to
protect intellectual property rights, they suffer little by way of loss
in research and development investment because foreign firms
currently investing in innovation are doing so elsewhere.'73 Due to
the relative lack of investment in research and development,
pursing policies such as compulsory licensing, which weaken
intellectual property protection but maximize competition by
ensuring efficient disbursement of ideas, are currently in China's
best interest.174
V. Implications of Irreconcilable Compulsory Licensing
Policies: Recommendations for a Path Forward
A. Is an International Antitrust Agreement the Solution?
There has been growing concern that the AML is being used
by China as a tool to further its national interest and is deterring
foreign firms from conducting business in China."' MOFCOM's
decision to require mandatory licensing of Google's Android
operating system as a condition of Google's acquisition of
Motorola will only stoke the now familiar refrain of
protectionism.' In the immediate aftermath of the decision, it
appears that there is a degree of validity to the claims that the
MOFCOM decision was influenced by a desire to
disproportionally benefit consumers and domestic firms,
especially when considering that the decision will guarantee
Chinese handset makers the continued opportunity to compete.1
MOFCOM's aggressiveness raises legitimate issues and calls to
mind the warning that "competition rules serve . .. as the perfect
non-diplomatic, undetected platform from which to advance local
economic and industrial considerations under the mask of legal
172 See id.
173 See id at 150-51.
174 See id at 149-51.
175 See supra Part 11.
176 MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61.
177 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, 149-51 (explaining that when countries
compel licensing, they are making a choice to favor the competitive benefits that are
associated with free disbursement of technology, such as greater consumer choice and
lower prices, over long term incentives for intellectual property holders to invest in
innovation that are associated with strong protection of intellectual property rights).
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arguments.""' Beyond any negative consequences that befall
foreign firms doing business in China, MOFCOM's tough stance
on compulsory licensing will affect all acquisitions of powerful
intellectual property by firms with an international reach.'7 9
Where the market for a product affected by the acquisition of
powerful intellectual property is "truly international, the most
aggressive competition law regime can effectively create rules of
worldwide application."' 80  Therefore, multinational firms
undertaking large transactions, especially U.S. firms that are
accustomed to a high level of intellectual property protection, will
be plagued by uncertainty and increased transaction costs so long
as the incongruity between Chinese and U.S. antitrust officials
persists.'8 '
Harmonization of merger review regimes could help to
eliminate the waste and inconsistencies inherent in the current
global antitrust system.' 82 Requiring firms to submit multinational
merger proposals to several different global entities increases the
overall cost of the transaction." Firms waste resources in the
initial process of identifying jurisdictions where they must file and
preparing filings. 8 4  The increased transaction costs associated
with duplicitous requirements lead to unnecessary waste in
mergers with an international scope.' For instance, Google
submitted its acquisition of Motorola to merger review agencies in
seven different states.' 86 In addition to the increased transaction
178 Ariel Ezrachi, Globalization of Merger Control: A Look at Bilateral
Cooperation Through the GE/Honeywell Case, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 397, 408 (2002).
179 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 136 (explaining that when firms must
submit proposed mergers to multiple national agencies for approval, the country with the
toughest requirements becomes the most influential by default in any given substantive
area).
180 Id.
181 See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1501, 1502-05 (1998) [hereinafter Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?].
182 See id at 1505.
183 See Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at 355-56
("The most obvious problem is duplication of costs. Firms must satisfy regulatory
agencies in many countries, meaning they must hire legal representation in each state and
meet the reporting and disclosure requirements of each jurisdiction.").
184 See Ezrachi, supra note 178, at 404.
185 See Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at 355.
186 See Steven M. Davidoff, China Flexes Its Regulatory Muscle, Catching Google
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costs associated with multiple filings, the ever-increasing number
of jurisdictions reviewing a transaction enhances the intricacy of
the process, which in turn "reduces legal and economic
certainty."' 8 7 Also, as the number of jurisdictions reviewing a
transaction increases, predictability decreases, subjecting firms to
greater risk of inconsistent conditions that are costly, or
impossible, to comply with.'" In addition, the extraterritoriality of
antitrust law ensures inevitable temptation for national regulators
to act more aggressively toward foreign firms when they believe it
to be in their nations' economic interest.189 As referenced
previously, MOFCOM's decision in the Google/Motorola case has
already raised such grumblings.19 0 However, even when there is
no bias, the perception of bias could prevent firms from pursuing
what would otherwise be beneficial transactions as well as cause
extraneous hostility in the international community.191
While harmonization is an admirable solution to such
extraneous waste and would lead to greater overall welfare by way
of increased predictability and lower transaction costs, the most
appropriate method by which to achieve harmonization is open to
debate.' 92 The most widely considered options for international
in Its Grip, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/china-
flexes-its-regulatory-muscle-catching-google-in-its-grip/ (noting that Google complied
with merger notification procedures in the United States, the European Union, China,
Canada, Israel, Russia, and Turkey).
187 See Ezrachi, supra note 178, at 402-04 ("Failure to predict the outcomes of
these procedures may result in financial loss for the undertakings and a weakening of
their competitive ability.").
188 See Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at 555-56;
see also Ezrachi, supra note 178, at 402 ("The existence of different approaches to the
same transaction also heightens the risk of imposing inconsistent limitations on the
undertakings seeking approval and may undermine their confidence in the process.").
189 See Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at 356-57.
190 See Todd Bishop, Last Hurdle for Google's $12.5B Motorola Deal: China,
GEEKWIRE (Mar. 19, 2012, 7:17 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2012/hurdle-googles-
125b-motorola-deal-china.
191 See Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at 356-57
("[E]ven if the process is unbiased, foreign firms subject to review-as well as their
governments-may believe that an unfavorable ruling represents an attempt to penalize
foreign firms.").
192 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181 at
1542-47 (arguing that there are various means through which to achieve international
harmonization of antitrust law, all of which have positives and negatives associated with
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harmonization of antitrust law, and more specifically merger
review, are broad multinational agreements and bilateral
agreements between key states.19 In order to avoid the disparate
results seen in the Google/Motorola case, one option available to
the United States is to use political and economic force to pressure
China to bring its merger review regime into compliance with U.S.
ideals on the value of innovation and the importance of
consistently protecting intellectual property rights.'9 4 For instance,
the United States may work toward bringing China into a broad
multilateral agreement, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development'95 (OECD) or the International
Competition Network (ICN).19 6 The OECD and ICN seek to foster
compatible standards and best practices in merger review as part
of an ongoing effort to increase the ease of doing business
globally.' 97  Inclusion of states such as China in a "broad
multilateral agreement" would be "more successful in reducing
costly distortions to international trade."' 98 However, in reality,
any benefits gained, as measured in consistency of outcomes,
would be marginal.' 99 Working within the current framework of
them).
193 See id. at 1542-46; see also Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra
note 132, at 368-74.
194 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at
1542-47 (noting that there is room for states to negotiate over substantive antitrust issues,
even where the parties have different interests, so long as one party is willing to
compromise and the other party is willing to make a transfer payment for the
compromise).
195 See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation, Dec. 14, 1960,
888 U.N.T.S. 179, available at http://www.oecd.org/general/conventiononthe
organisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm.
196 See Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the International
Competition Network (Oct. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
197 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION, POLICY
ROUNDTABLES: STANDARD FOR MERGER REVIEw (2009) [hereinafter ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION] (on file with author) (summarizing the OECD Competition
Committee's analysis of two merger review standards); INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2002)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK] (on file with author) (outlining the
Working Group's comments to various merger procedures).
198 Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at 1505.
199 See generally id at 1542-47 (positing that, where parties to a negotiation have
divergent interests, it will be difficult to convince any one nation to abandon those
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international antitrust agreements will necessarily only result in
modest benefits. 200  Agreements under both the ICN and OECD
are non-binding and, as a result, are limited to voluntary
information sharing, cooperation, and harmonization of procedural
rules.20' So long as both the ICN and OECD lack the ability to
govern substantive issues, there is no hope that agreements
reached within those organizations can prove outcome-
determinative with regard to issues at the cross section of antitrust
and intellectual property law.20 2
Bilateral agreements are another potential avenue toward
harmonization.20 3 Given the size and importance of both
economies, a bilateral agreement establishing joint principles for
merger review could begin to bridge the international gap in
standards for dealing with compulsory licensing issues.204
Precedent exists for bilateral antitrust agreements; the United
States has entered into bilateral agreements concerning antitrust
issues with twelve nations.20 5 In fact, a basis for agreement
between China and the United States, which may lay a foundation
interests in order to reach a meaningful agreement, and as a result the most likely
outcome of negotiations are modest information sharing agreements that do not have the
capability to reach consistent outcomes).
200 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, supra note 197
(emphasizing the non-binding nature of agreements reached by the OECD);
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 197 (emphasizing the non-binding
nature of agreements reached by ICN countries).
201 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, supra note 197; see also
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 197.
202 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 18 1, at
1542-47 (noting that non-binding information sharing and cooperation agreements are
unlikely to affect meaningful, substantive change that might be reached under a broad
multilateral binding agreement, which would be much more difficult to reach).
203 See id at 1505 ("Bilateral negotiations provide the most promising forum for
reaching agreement because they require only two countries to agree that cooperation
will increase national welfare.").
204 See id. at 1548; cf id. at 1505 ("[B]ilateral or regional agreements may reduce
the distortion of antitrust policy among the parties to the agreement, but they will not do
so between countries that are part of the agreement and those countries that are not.").
205 See Antitrust Cooperation Agreements, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-arrangements.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2013) (providing a list of bilateral antitrust agreements to which the United States is
a party).
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206for further cooperation, already exists. However, both
agreements suffer from the same shortcomings as the broad
international agreements. 2 07  The limited goals of the current
bilateral agreements are cooperation and information sharing. 208
Both agreements explicitly state their non-binding nature by
ensuring that "case cooperation does not prejudice each agency's
independent decision-making with respect to its cases." 20 9 Due to
the non-binding nature of current bilateral antitrust agreements and
their limited objectives-information sharing, cooperation, and
establishing procedural best practices 2 10-it is unlikely that the two
states will be able to reach an agreement capable of harmonizing
policies regarding substantive issues of merger review.211
Expending political capital on efforts to pressure China to
adopt an approach to merger review that is compatible with
206 See Guidance for Case Cooperation Between the Ministry of Commerce and the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission on Concentration of Undertakings
(Merger) Cases, U.S.-China, Nov. 29, 2011, [hereinafter Guidance for Merger Cases],
available at www.ftc.gov/os/2011/1 1/111129mofcom.pdf; see also Memorandum of
Understanding on Antitrust and Antimonopoly Cooperation Between the United States
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, on the One Hand, and the
People's Republic of China National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of
Commerce, and State Administration for Industry and Commerce, on the Other Hand,
U.S.-China, July 27, 2011 [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/07/110726mou-english.pdf.
207 Compare Guidance for Merger Cases, supra note 206, and Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 206, with ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION,
supra note 197, and INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 197.
208 See Guidance for Merger Cases, supra note 206 ("[C]ase cooperation between
the investigating agencies may help improve the efficiency of their investigations, and
thereby maintain competition in their jurisdictions."); see also Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 206, at 1 ("[Both parties] desiring to enhance the effective
enforcement of their competition laws and policies by creating a framework for long-
term cooperation between the U.S. antitrust agencies and the PRC antimonopoly
agencies.").
209 Guidance for Merger Cases, supra note 206; see also Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 206, at 3 ("Nothing in this Memorandum is intended to create
legally binding rights or obligations.").
210 See Guidance for Merger Cases, supra note 206; Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 206, at 2.
211 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at
1542-47 (noting that non-binding information sharing and cooperation agreements are
unlikely to affect meaningful, substantive change that might be reached under a broad
multilateral binding agreement, which would be much more difficult to reach).
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current American standards would be futile. 212 It is clear that the
current system, where each state operates a separate mechanism
for merger review, is "suboptimal"; however, it is doubtful that
meaningful, i.e., substantive and binding, international agreement
is possible.2 13  Too often, states that would be parties to an
agreement face perverse incentives that make their negotiating
positions wholly incompatible.2 14 Ultimately, national antitrust
officials will make choices that provide a net benefit to their
state's interests, even if the necessary corollary is a net loss to
another state's interests.2 15 For example, where one negotiating
party is an exporting state it will favor "a relatively weak antitrust
law because behavior with potentially anticompetitive effects
benefit[s] the country's producers and imposes costs only on
3316foreign consumers. When such a state negotiates with an
importing state, their interests will be in direct conflict and
agreement is unlikely.2 17
History bears out the difficulty of reaching international
agreements governing substantive antitrust policy. 218  To date,
there are, with the extraordinary exception of the European
Union, 2 19 "no meaningful international agreement[s] exist[ing] to
govern the application of antitrust policies to cross-border
212 See id at 1548 ("International agreements on antitrust policy will continue to be
difficult-and may be impossible-to reach because not all countries will benefit from
such agreements.").
213 See id at 1504 ("[R]egulating antitrust at the national level is suboptimal, and
an international approach to antitrust is likely to be welfare increasing."); Ezrachi, supra
note 178, at 401 ("In areas dominated by domestic considerations, states may implement
policies that are liable to contradict global aims.").
214 See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at 1504
("[T]he incentives facing individual countries make it extremely difficult-perhaps
impossible-to negotiate substantive international antitrust agreements.").
215 See id at 1529. "[I]ndividual countries will adopt policies that, although optimal
from a national perspective, are suboptimal from a global perspective." Id. at 1542.
216 Id. at 1529.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 1535-38.
219 See EU Treaty, supra note 28, art. 82. The Treaty Establishing the European
Community broadly provides: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States." Id. Examples of what constitutes "abuse" follow. See id
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activities."220
Within the Chinese-American context, so long as foreign firms
hold the majority of the high technology patents being exploited in
China, making China a net importer of high technology, there is
no incentive for China to enter into any agreement that would
compel it to strengthen intellectual property rights.2 21  Given that
the majority of the benefit from the unfettered, exclusive use of
such intellectual property will come back to the United States by
way of domestic intellectual property holders, the United States
has incentive to under-regulate powerful intellectual property.222
In contrast, China has the incentive to over-regulate because
failing to do so, as in the context of the Google/Motorola case,
may subject Chinese consumers and competitors to
anticompetitive harms associated with monopoly rents and may
provide Google, a U.S. firm more likely to make investments in
innovation in the United States, with the benefits of intellectual
223property protection.
Furthermore, reaching a substantive agreement on compulsory
licensing policy would cost the United States significant economic
and political capital. 2 24 Despite the negative effects of compulsory
licensing on foreign acquirers of powerful intellectual property,
which result in large part from variances in policy, such capital
220 See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at 1535.
221 See id. at 1529; Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 138, 151-53.
222 See generally Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, 127-32 (observing that the U.S.
strategy to intellectual property rights favors the monopolist through its long-term
outlook, thereby incentivizing research and development); Guzman, Is International
Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at 1532 (reviewing a case analogous to the China-
U.S. context, explaining that, as far as U.S. firms are concerned, "if the laws of the
United States and those of another country regulate the same activity, the stricter of the
laws will govern").
223 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 18 1, at
1532 (reviewing an analogous case); Ezrachi, supra note 178, at 407 ("A given
jurisdiction will strive to shield its local markets from a negative transfer of wealth,
while the jurisdiction that receives the positive transfer of wealth caused by the
anticompetitive behavior of its local corporations will be reluctant to act against such
behavior.").
224 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at
1542 (expounding on the difficulties involved in international antitrust negotiations,
noting in particular that convincing parties to overlook the detriment to their interest that
could result from joining the agreement may require substantial compensation
payments).
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expenditures are needless.2 25  To persuade a state to enter an
agreement that may cause net harm to its domestic interest, there
must be a payment to that state to lessen the blow.2 26 As explained
above,227 it would not serve China's national interest to curtail its
use of compulsory licensing.22 8 In order to persuade China to enter
such an agreement, the United States would have to make a
compensatory payment to shift the incentive balance in favor of
reaching an agreement. 229 Although the payment need not take the
form of monetary compensation, the United States would have to
compromise on another policy position valuable to China.230
Given the current benefits China receives from its compulsory
licensing policy, the reciprocal payment necessary to induce it to
enter a substantive antitrust agreement would be significant.23
When such a payment is added to the political capital that would
be expended in the negotiation process, the cost-benefit analysis
places an international agreement with China outside the interest
of the United States.232
225 See generally Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 127-30 (arguing that holders
of powerful intellectual property will be harmed by compulsory licensing because they
will not be able to realize the full value of the inventions where the underlying
technology is widely disbursed).
226 See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at 1542.
("Unlike trade policy agreements, antitrust policy agreements do not necessarily improve
the welfare of all countries that participate in a cooperative regime; some may suffer a
welfare loss.").
227 See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
228 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 149-53.
229 See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 18 1, at 1542.
Additionally, there is the "free rider" problem, where "some countries may choose not to
contribute to the compensation package offered to those countries that lose from an
agreement," but nonetheless would benefit from the change in policy. Id. at 1544.
230 See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at 1545
("Notice that transfer payments need not involve money.... [C]ountries may be able to
negotiate an antitrust policy agreement if those countries that stand to lose are able to
extract concessions in other areas of negotiations.").
231 See id at 1544-46 ("[I]n the world of international commercial law, transaction
costs are far from zero and information is less than perfect. . . . Because developing
countries are more often net importers .. . and developed countries are more often net
exporters . .. agreement is unlikely. . . .").
232 See id. at 1544 ("Costs arise due to a variety of factors, including the political
realities faced by negotiators (e.g., voters may be against an agreement, uncertainty with
respect to the magnitude of the costs and benefits of an agreement, and concern
regarding the future behavior of the other countries.").
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B. In Favor of the Evolving Status Quo
If pursuing an international agreement to bridge the policy gap
between the United States and China is too costly, ineffectual, and
improbable,233 what other options are available for states whose
firms face uncertainty and costs inherent in a status quo where two
major merger review regimes may, as witnessed in the
Google/Motorola case, reach inconsistent results? Given China's
current trajectory, as measured in terms of high technology patents
granted, it is in the best interest of the United States and others
who prefer greater protection of intellectual property rights to
simply wait for China's compulsory licensing policy to evolve,234
rather than expend capital trying to force China's hand, and risk
souring the relationship with an emerging superpower.2 35
The proportion of Chinese patents granted to foreign firms fell
from 72.67% in 2002, to 50.28% in 2008.236 Given the current
trend, the number of patents granted to domestic inventors,
measured as a proportion of total patents granted, will continue to
rise.237 In fact, as of 2010, fifty-nine percent of all patents were
granted to domestic applicants. 238 Granting more domestic patents
239is a sign of greater investment in innovation. Investment in
innovation shifts the balance between static and dynamic
efficiency.24 0 Specifically, when the proportion of high technology
233 See supra Part V.A.
234 See generally McEwin, supra note 109, at 1-4 (explaining that as a state's
economy transitions, intellectual property protection becomes increasingly important,
even when incentivizing innovation investment comes at a price).
235 See Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 18 1, at 1548
(noting the difficulty in reaching an agreement where the negotiating parties have
divergent interests); Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at
368-69 (explaining the costs involved in "noncooperative policymaking").
236 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 151.
237 See id
238 China Grants More Patents in 2010, XINHUA NEWS ENGLISH (Jan. 13, 2011,
12:47 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english20I0/china/2011-01/13/c_13688
01 8.htm.
239 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 149-51 (observing that, contrary to the
"so-called developing country argument," which holds that "China would benefit
from . . . provid[ing] relatively little protection to [intellectual property]," the "situation
is changing as China becomes more economically developed.").
240 See id. at 150-51 (noting that where a state has little prospects for investment in
research and development, its best interests are served not by protecting intellectual
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patents granted to domestic inventors increases, the cost of weak
intellectual property rights, measured by the disincentive for
innovation, gradually shifts from foreign firms to Chinese
211companies.
Eventually, it will be in China's interest to protect intellectual
property rights more stringently, in part by limiting the use of
compulsory licensing.24 2 It will no longer be in China's interest to
coerce acquirers of powerful intellectual property to license
patents, because Chinese holders of similar patents will also be
vulnerable to such action.2 43 If foreign and domestic acquirers of
powerful intellectual property may be subjected to compulsory
licensing, domestic innovation will be curbed right along with
foreign innovation and, as a result, domestic inventors will be
unable to realize the full commercial benefits of their inventions.2 44
China will transition toward a policy that further incentivizes
investment in innovation because a greater portion of that
investment will be occurring domestically. 245 Therefore, as the
proportion of high technology patents granted in China increases,
the dynamic gains of encouraging research and development will
outweigh the short-term anticompetitive costs of allowing
sanctioned monopolies over powerful intellectual property.246
With these considerations in the cost-benefit analysis, which
property rights, but by ensuring that the technology behind the intellectual property held
by foreign firms is widely disbursed in order to benefit local competitors and consumers,
but arguing that in China, the converse is likely true).
241 See id. at 149-52.
242 See generally id. at 149-51 (arguing that where the majority of high technology
patents are being exploited by foreign firms it will be in that state's interest to compel
licensing of powerful intellectual property, and, conversely, that as an economy
transitions and more patents are granted to domestic firms, the state's interest shifts and
compulsory licensing is no longer a viable policy).
243 See id. at 151 (observing that "the profile of patent grant is changing in China,"
which "challenge[s] . . . the standard developing country argument").
244 See id. at 127-30.
245 See generally Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 127-30 (noting that the more
stringently a state protects intellectual property rights, the greater incentive there will be
for firms to invest in research and development, which leads to innovation).
246 See id. at 150-52 ("Given the trend of China's economic growth and the national
strategy to develop an innovation-oriented country ... . weak [intellectual property]
protection and unwarranted compulsory licensing . .. [will suppress] independent
innovation.").
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informs compulsory licensing policy, a greater overall alignment
of U.S. and Chinese policies at the intersection of antitrust and
intellectual property law will result.24 7 As both states move closer
to a point of convergence, there will be no need for an
international agreement, because benefits of an agreement
diminish as standards become increasingly similar.248 The United
States should continue on its current path, using information
sharing agreements to maintain a positive working relationship
with the Chinese authorities, while avoiding any unnecessary
tension that would accompany efforts to force China to change its
merger review policies. 249
VI. Conclusion
The enactment of the AML was an extraordinary event and an
important milestone denoting greater economic liberalization and
openness in China.250 For all of the opportunities presented by the
AML, there are also many challenges facing Chinese antitrust
authorities as they implement and interpret the law.251' Not the
least of these challenges is the potential and perceived bias of the
Chinese authorities, who may be tempted to use the law to benefit
local industries and consumers by selectively enforcing the law
against foreign firms.252
The recent acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google
247 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at
1546-47 (explaining that where two states' interests align, their antitrust policies are
more likely to harmonize).
248 See generally Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, 149-51 (noting that the one
factor leading to China's compulsory licensing policy is that foreign firms are
disproportionately benefited by protection of intellectual property rights).
249 See Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, supra note 132, at 356
(arguing that issues arising in the context of incompatible antitrust regimes are ripe to
cause hostility among states).
250 See Huo, supra note 2, at 32-33 ("Since the largest developing country in the
world can now claim to have a systematic antitrust law, the law's passage is a historic
moment in China's legal history.").
251 See Zheng, supra note 3, at 651 ("[D]espite having a Western-style antitrust
law, China has not developed and likely will not develop Western-style antitrust
jurisprudence in the near future due to [] local conditions.").
252 See Harris, supra note 1, at 171 (noting the concern that the AML's enforcement
provisions may only be used against foreign companies, which would inevitably, if not
consciously, benefit domestic firms).
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provides an early case study of how these issues will present
themselves. 25 3  By compelling Google to continue to license its
Android operating software freely for five years, MOFCOM acted
more aggressively than its merger review counterparts in the
United States and Europe.2 54 Despite initial reports that it was
motivated by a desire to ensure the continued viability of a
growing domestic smartphone industry,2 55 the decision shows that
the compulsory licensing policy of China is not a threat to the
continued efficacy of the AML or the interests of foreign firms
operating in China.25 6 As is often the case in modem antitrust
regimes, Chinese officials enforce the law's provisions in a way
that is most beneficial to China's national interest. 257  Although
MOFCOM's early willingness to apply tough restrictions on
proposed mergers may cause apprehension among the
international business community,2 58  especially considering the
inconsistency among the United States, the European Union, and
China259  with regard to compulsory licensing, the
Google/Motorola decision is more likely to be a blip on the radar
than the start of a lasting trend.2 60
If the United States remains patient and refrains from taking an
overtly aggressive stance toward Beijing, China's economy will
253 See, e.g., DOJ STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 1.
254 Compare MOFCOM DECISION, supra note 61, with DOJ STATEMENT, supra note
66, at 1, and Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14 (noting that both the United States and the
European Union approved the merger without conditions).
255 See Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14.
256 See generally Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 149-51 (explaining that
China's compulsory licensing policy is informed by its status as an importer of high
technology, but economic development may lead to a change in the compulsory
licensing policy).
257 See generally Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 181, at
1502-06 (explaining that states often have conflicting interests when it comes to antitrust
policies and objectives, and as a result, officials will pursue policies in their nation's
interest even if those policies harm consumers or firms in foreign states).
258 See Letzing & Mozur, supra note 14 (hypothesizing that MOFCOM's decision
to apply a compulsory licensing condition to the merger was motivated by a desire to
benefit domestic industry at the expense of Google and Motorola's new relationship).
259 See Jacobs & Zhang, supra note 106, at 128-38, 149-51.
260 See generally id. at 149-51 (observing that, broadly speaking, as China's
proportion of high technology held by domestic firms increases, the incentives to
maintain a compulsory licensing policy diminish).
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continue to evolve and become more technologically advanced,
creating greater incentive for Chinese authorities to protect
intellectual property rights as a strategy to encourage domestic
investment in innovation. 26 ' As that incentive grows, compulsory
licensing will become less viable as a remedy in merger review
cases, allowing for a natural convergence of American and
Chinese merger review policy. 2 62
261 See generally id. at 150-51.
262 See generally id. at 127-30, 149-51.
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